Pervasive, easy-to-use privacy services are keys to enabling users to maintain control of their private data in the online environment. This paper proposes (1) an online privacy lifecycle from the user perspective that drives and categorizes the development of these services, (2) a layered platform design solution for online privacy, (3) the evolution of the PeCAN (Personal Context Agent Networking) architecture to a platform for pervasively providing multiple contexts for user privacy preferences and online informational privacy services, and (4) use (...) of platform network effects for increasing wide-scale user adoption of privacy services. One implication of this paper’s concepts is that platform-mediated networks, which are reportedly the vehicles for most of the revenue earned by 60 of the world’s largest companies, and other platforms that commonly host millions of users, will not have to individually reinvent and manage sophisticated user services for privacy protection since universal privacy platforms can be layered on them in future. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the aim, task and results of philosophy. In this essay I suggest that his ‘picture theory’ of language implies that clarity has aesthetic significance in philosophical work. Wittgenstein claims that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. In the ‘picture theory’ of thought and language, a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and a proposition is a picture of reality. The question I pose (...) is: how should we construe clarity, if making a thought clear is making clear a picture of reality? Following a close analysis of the picture theory, paying particular attention to the notions of depicting, presenting and mirroring, I conclude that the result of philosophical work – the clarification of propositions – will be pleasurable, inexpressible and intrinsically valuable. For these reasons I suggest that the attainment of a clear thought is an aesthetic experience. (shrink)

As nursing moves towards a holistic approach to care, its publications on sexuality have proliferated. 'Sexuality' and 'Gender' are concepts which are extremely difficult to define. While sex refers to the physical differences of the body, gender concerns the psychological and sociocultural differences between females and males. This distinction between sex and gender is fundamental, since many differences between females and males are not biological in origin. And, when a person's gender and sex fall together in accordance with social norms, (...) it may not necessarily be a similar correlation for every individual. The nature of these similarities is essentially threefold. First, Thomas, Savage and Webb accept that there should be a nursing definition of sexuality. In different ways they acknowledge and refer to it as an integral part of a person's being and self concept. Secondly, the authors underline some of the complexities and difficulties nurses have defining and dealing with it in professional relationships as well as on the level of self reflection, knowledge, attitudes and beliefs. Thirdly, all three surveys show why such difficulties prevail, and go on to make suggestions for change in nursing interventions and training. This article summarizes these contributions and discusses the ethical problems which nurses face in dealing with the sexuality of their patients. Pendant que les soins deviennent plus complet, les publications sur la sexualité se sont multipliés. Sexualité et genre sont des idées qui sont difficiles à définir. Pendant que 'sexualité' fait allusion aux différences entre les corps, 'genre' regarde les différences psychologiques et socioculturelles entre femmes et hommes. Cette distinction entre sexualité et genre est fondamentale, puisque beaucoup des différences entre femmes et hommes ne sont pas d'origine biologique. Et quand le genre et la sexualité d'une personne sont en accord avec les normes sociaux, il n'y a toujours pas une même correlation pour chaque individu. La nature de ces ressemblances est triple: premièrement, Thomas, Savage et Webb acceptent qu'une définition pour infirmiers/ères de las sexualité devrait exister. De plusières manières ils l'acceptent, et en réfèrent comme à un part total de l'être et idée de soi de la personne. Deuxièmement, les auteurs soulignent quelques-unes des difficultés et complexités que les infirmier/ères rencontrent dans leurs relations professionnelles aussi bien que dans leurs reflexions, compréhensions, attitudes et convictions personelles. Troisièmement, les trois études montrent pourquoi ces difficultès continuent encore, et suggèrent des changements en interventions et formation professionnelle. L'article-ci résume ces contributions et discute les problèmes éthiques des infirmier/ères vis-à-vis de la sexualité de leurs malades. Weil sich die ganzheitliche Pflege vermehrt, vermehren sich auch die Veröffentli chungen über Sexualität. Sexualität und Geschlecht sind Begriffe, die sehr schwierig zu beschreiben sind. Sexualität bezieht sich auf die physikalischen, und Geschlecht auf die psychologischen und kulturellen Unterschiede zwischen Frauen und Männern. Diese Unterschiede zwischen Sexualität und Geschlecht sind grundsätzlich, denn viele Verschiedenheiten zwischen Frauen und Männern haben keinen biologischen Ursprung. Wenn die Sexualität und das Geschlecht einer Person zusammen fallen mit den gesellschaftlichen Normen, bedeutet es noch nicht, dass es sich für alle solche Leute auf das selbe hinbezieht. Das bedeutende dieser Aehnlichkeiten ist dreifach: erstens, Thomas, Savage und Webb akzeptieren dass es eine Definition der Sexualität für die Krankenpflege geben sollte. Auf verschiedene Arten bestätigen sie sie, und weisen auf das Wesen der Person und deren Selbst-Vorstellung als etwas Vollständiges hin. Zweitens, diese Autoren betonen die Verwicklungen und Schwierigkeiten, die das Krankenpflegepersonal hat mit der Sexualität in beruflichen Beziehungen wie auch in persönlichem Nachdenken, Einstellungen und Ueberzeugungen. Drittens, alle drei Ueberblicke zeigen warum solche Schwierigkeiten weiterhin bestehen, und machen Vorschläge für Aenderungen in Pflegeeingriffen und Unterricht. Dieser Artikel fasst diese Beiträge zusammen und diskutiert die ethischen Probleme die das Krankenpflegepersonal hat mit der Sexualität der Patienten. (shrink)

삶은 상처이자 치유의 과정이다! 일상으로 소환한 인문학에서 찾은 삶과 행복의 기본과 원칙 ◎ 도서 소개 인문학의 두 번째 질문, “어떻게 살 것인가?” 고은, 용타, 김상근, 최인철, 차드 멩 탄… 최고의 지성 12인의 상처를 극복하고 공생하는 방법! 존재의 본질에 대한 논의를 잇는 근원적 물음, 어떻게 살 것인가. 삶의 황폐화와 사회 가치의 퇴색, 현실 문제에 대한 근원적인 해결책의 부재로 현대인들은 인간과 삶, 죽음에 대한 근원적인 물음을 품기 시작했다. 그 물음 끝에 탄생한 『어떻게 살 것인가』는 2014년 가을 플라톤 아카데미가 주최한 동명의 대중강연을 엮은 (...) 것으로, 누적 6만 명 이상 청중들의 열광적인 호응을 불러일으켰다. 1부에서 김상근, 한명기, 조성택, 석영중, 황현산, 고은은 인류의 역사 속에 우리 삶의 이정표를 세우는 작업을 통해 너를 살피고 나를 다스리는 지혜를 설파한다. 2부에서 손봉호, 박승찬, 차드 멩 탄, 최인철, 용타, 이강호는 상처를 견디며 행복하게 살아가기 위한 고민을 통해 삶은 상처를 치유하는 과정이라고 역설한다. 삶과 행복의 기본과 원칙이 현실에 닥친 슬픔과 혼란을 극복하고 함께 앞으로 나아갈 수 있는 힘이며, 황폐해진 개인의 삶과 희미해진 사회적 가치를 극복할 수 있는 해답임을 역사와 철학, 종교와 문학 등 인문학 여러 분야를 넘나들며 증명한다. ◎ 출판사 서평 상처 입은 사회, 우리는 어떻게 살아야 할까? 공생하는 삶에 대한 12가지 실천적 철학 나는 누구인가, 어떻게 살 것인가, 어떻게 죽을 것인가. 현대인들이 잊고 살지만, 인생에서 가장 중요한 질문이다. 개인의 삶이 점점 황폐해지고 사회 가치가 희미해지는 요즘, 이러한 근원적인 물음은 우리 삶에 더욱 중요해졌다. ‘인간’을 탐구하고 ‘인생’을 공부하는 학문인 인문학 열풍이 거세진 것도 이와 같은 이유다. 그 물음 끝에 탄생한 『어떻게 살 것인가』는 2014년 가을 플라톤 아카데미가 주최한 동명의 대중강연을 엮은 것으로, 누적 6만 명 이상 청중들의 열광적인 호응을 불러일으켰다. 마치 눈앞에서 듣는 것처럼 고은, 용타, 김상근, 최인철, 차드 멩 탄 등 이 시대를 대표하는 지성 12인이 전하는 삶의 지혜와 인문학적 통찰이 뜨거운 감동과 함께 생생하게 전달된다. 우리 일상에 맞닿은 사례들을 중심으로 삶의 본질을 탐구하며, 위대한 고전과 사상가들의 핵심 메시지를 깊이 있고 흥미롭게 분석했다. 독자들은 이 책을 통해 ‘어떻게 살 것인가’라는 삶의 근원적인 물음에 명쾌한 해답을 얻을 수 있을 것이며, 흔들리고 방황하는 삶에 용기와 철학을 정립할 수 있을 것이다. 행복한 삶을 향한 역사, 철학, 종교, 문학의 성찰 어떻게 살 것인가에 관한 질문은 반드시 ‘행복’이라는 대답으로 이어진다. 역사, 철학, 종교, 문학 등 다양한 시각으로 삶의 방법을 분석한 우리 시대 최고 지성 12인이 상처를 극복하고 함께 행복하게 살아갈 수 있는 방법을 이야기한다. 개인과 사회가 서로 신뢰할 때 우리의 삶은 여유로워지고 사회는 안전해진다. 1부에서는 인류의 역사 속에 우리 삶의 이정표를 세우는 작업을 통해 너를 살피고 나를 다스리는 지혜를 배운다. 대한민국 사회를 ‘아포리아’ 시대로 규정하며 위기를 극복할 수 있는 지혜를 고대 그리스에서 찾은 김상근, 『징비록』에 담긴 역사적 기록을 통해 세계 격변의 시기에 우리가 취해야 할 자세를 고민하는 한명기, 원효의 화쟁사상을 통해 시민의 지혜와 대화의 중요성을 강조한 조성택, 톨스토이의 『안나 카레니나』를 바탕으로 몰입, 소통, 죽음 세 단계의 성장하는 삶을 이야기한 석영중, 주체로서의 나와 타자로서의 나를 소통시키는 시(詩)의 힘을 통해 잘 사는 법을 전한 황현산, 극심한 갈등 속 자기중심적 삶에서 벗어나 세계사적 의미의 통합을 이룰 것을 주장한 고은 시인을 통해 산다는 문제가 공생에 관한 논의로 확장되는 것을 경험한다. 2부에서는 상처를 견디며 행복하게 살아가기 위한 고민을 통해 삶은 상처를 치유하는 과정이라고 역설한다. 우리가 행복하지 않은 이유로 지나친 경쟁심과 불공정한 규칙을 꼽으며 정직하게 나와 타인의 행복과 이익을 함께 추구하는 것이 우리가 지켜야 할 자존심이자 원칙이라고 전하는 손봉호, 나의 ‘홀로서기’와 타인과의 ‘함께 걷기’를 통해서 고통을 넘어서는 희망을 찾을 수 있다는 대안을 제시한 박승찬, 감성지능을 개발하기 위한 세 단계인 주의력 집중, 자기 인식, 정신 습관을 통해 행복의 비법을 전한 차드 멩 탄, 행복을 마음이 아닌 몸과 연결 지어 일상에서 행복을 느낄 수 있는 방법을 찾아나가는 최인철, ‘나, 모두의 행복, 마음 천국, 관계 천국, 세상 천국’이라는 다섯 가지 원리를 통해 나를 이해하는 것에서부터 세계 평화가 시작함을 이야기한 용타, 준비하고 실행하는 삶, 주인공이 되는 삶, 기본과 원칙을 중시하고 만남을 소중히 하는 삶이라는 삶의 다섯 가지 실천을 제시한 이강호를 통해 우리는 어떻게 사는 삶이 행복한 삶인지 다시 한번 숙고하게 된다. 인문학의 목소리로 전하는 인간의 삶과 행복, 기본과 원칙은 현실에 닥친 슬픔과 혼란을 극복하고 함께 앞으로 나아갈 수 있는 힘을 전한다. 황폐해진 개인의 삶과 희미해진 사회적 가치를 극복할 해답을 인문학에서 찾았다. ◎ 본문 중에서 만약 인문학적 성찰이 ‘나는 누구인가’에만 머무른다면 그것은 매우 이기적인 일일지도 모르겠습니다. 인문학은 자기 성찰에서 출발해 이웃과 세상 사람들, 그리고 사회 속에서 행동하고 실천하는 작업까지 이어져야 합니다. 그렇기에 인문학은 반드시 두 번째 질문인 ‘어떻게 살 것인가’로 나아가야 합니다. (14쪽) 『징비록』은 조선 선조 때 영의정을 지낸 서애(西厓) 류성룡이 집필한 임진왜란(壬辰倭亂)의 전란사입니다. 제목인 징비(懲毖)는 『시경(詩經)』 「소비편(小毖篇)」의 “예기징 이비후환(豫基懲 而毖後患)”, 즉 내가 경계함은 후환을 삼가기 위함이라는 구절에서 한 글자씩 따왔습니다. (…) 그는 임진왜란 당시의 참담한 상황을 기록하면서, 동시에 난이 일어나기 이전의 일도 기록해 그 원인이 어디에 있었는지를 밝히려고 했습니다. (31~32쪽) 세상의 중심에 서서 세상을 이어주는 것이 바로 인문 정신이며 시민의 지혜라고 생각합니다. 시민의 지혜로 세상을 바라볼 때, 논쟁이 화쟁적 대화로 이어질 때, 갈등과 분쟁은 더 이상 문제 상황이 아니라 더 큰 진리가 드러나는 에너지요, 기회가 될 것입니다. (97쪽) 톨스토이는 ‘어떻게 살 것인가’라는 질문에 대한 답을 작품을 통해 보여주게 되는데요, 그 답은 바로 ‘성장’입니다. 성장이란 인간이 끊임없는 성찰과 학습을 통해 자기완성에 도달하는 과정입니다. 톨스토이는 성장에 대해 “끊임없이 보다 나은 사람이 되어가는 것”이라고 이야기합니다. (99~100쪽) 개인의 사소한 사정은 더더욱 표현하기 어렵습니다. 사회적인 문제들을 표현하기 위해서는 연대도 가능하고 협력도 가능합니다. 그러나 자기 안에 있는 문제는, 실제로 모든 사람들이 똑같이 느끼고 있음에도 불구하고 연대가 불가능하고 협력도 어렵습니다. 바로 그 사이에 다리를 놓고 협력할 수 있도록 해주는 것이 문학입니다. 또한 그것들을 표현할 말을 만들어내고, 그것들을 표현하기 위해 어떤 특별한 세계를 개발하고 또 그것들을 전파할 수 있도록 약속하는 것이 문학입니다. 그리고 그 문학의 전위가 바로 시(詩)이며, 시가 바로 그 일을 합니다. (135쪽) 아내가 “삶은 상처다”라고 아주 멋진 말을 하더군요. 그리고 삶은 상처를 치유하는 과정이라고 덧붙였습니다. 일상은 늘 상처를 만들고 상처와 만나고 그 상처를 조금씩 치유해주고 가라앉혀주는 것이라고요. 진짜 삶은 누구에 의해 혹은 누구의 규범과 교훈에 종속되어 노예로 사는 것이 아니라 자기 자신으로 살아가는 것입니다. (…) 실존의 존엄성을 우주의 그 누구도 모독할 수 없습니다. (154~155쪽) 우리는 우리의 행동이 어떤 경로를 거쳐 어떤 결과를 가져올지 알아야 하고, 그 결과에 따른 책임도 져야 합니다. 그것이 오늘날 우리에게 필요한 윤리입니다. 그러려면 선한 동기만이 아니라 지식도 있어야 하고, 능력도 있어야 합니다. (185쪽) 고통을 극복하기 위해서는 누구도 자신의 고통을 이해해주지 못한다는 사실을 받아들여야 합니다. 기대할수록 상처는 더욱 커집니다. 고통은 홀로 맞서야만 하는 주관적인 체험입니다. 그렇더라도 고통에 빠진 사람 옆에서 함께 걸어주십시오. 그러면 내가 고통스러울 때 그 사람도 나와 함께 걸어줄 것입니다. 이런 홀로서기와 함께 걷기를 통해서 우리는 고통을 넘어서는 희망을 찾을 수 있습니다. (219쪽) 행복의 비법은 바로 이것입니다. 먼저 마음을 고요하게 해보세요. 그러면 에너지가 필요 없는 기쁨의 세계로 나아갈 수 있습니다. 그리고 자기 인식 능력을 발전시켜서 번뇌로부터 벗어나세요. 마지막으로 친절과 자비를 베풀고 이를 습관화합니다. 이 모든 과정이 훈련을 통해 얼마든지 가능합니다. (238쪽) 단백질, 탄수화물, 지방이 몸을 움직이는 3대 영양소라면, 자유와 유능감과 관계는 영혼을 숨 쉬게 하는 3대 영양소입니다. 그러므로 행복한 삶을 산다는 것은 이 세 가지 에너지를 지속적으로 공급받는 것이라 할 수 있습니다. 그리고 이런 에너지는 당연히 마음 관리에서 나옵니다. 저는 신체활동이나 일상의 여러 활동을 통해 얼마든지 영혼에 에너지를 공급할 수 있다는 이야기를 하려 합니다. (248쪽) 행복한 삶을 위한 원리를 정리하면 ‘나는 모두의 행복을 위해 수심하여 마음 천국 이루고, 화합하여 관계 천국 이루고, 작선하여 세상 천국 이루리라’입니다. 우리 모두가 이 원리만 지키고 살아도 가정의 평화, 세계의 평화, 우주의 평화를 이룰 수 있습니다. (273쪽) 매일 아침, 우리에게는 똑같은 태양이 떠오릅니다. 그리고 똑같은 시간이 주어지지요. 태양과 시간을 어떻게 자기 것으로 만들어가느냐에 따라 각자의 삶이 달라질 것입니다. ‘Every dawn is a new beginning.’ 매일마다의 아침은 또 하나의 새로운 시작입니다. 여러분은 어떤 삶을 원하십니까? (297쪽). (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the centrality of aspect seeing in Wittgenstein's philosophy, with some analogies between religious beliefs and aspect seeing, and with the implications of these analogies for the question of the justification of religious beliefs. If belief in God is neither a hypothesis nor a regular perceptual belief but rather a type of aspect seeing, then the kinds of proofs and justifications that are applicable to it would have to engage the non-believer in a manner that would (...) help her experience the dawning of a new aspect. This is why the standard philosophical proofs for theism, even when accepted as valid, are likely to be unsuccessful in bringing about faith. (shrink)

Evil and the fear coming along with it — either the fear to become its victim or its agent — is haunting mankind’s consciousness since the dawn of time. The powerful instinctive rejection that evil causes is only natural, and yet it prevents us from cognizing it and, thus, from building more effective defenses against it. Art sublimes the direct blow of our anxiety by transforming evil into symbolic and metaphorical figures which we can imaginably deal with and even (...) accept them, making them specifically interesting and even attractive. Along with artistic indulgence we strengthen the sense of metaphysical control over evil: Eventually shaping evil as a notion and an aggregative image we confirm to ourselves that we do have the ability to rise to the transcendent height of considering the Being as a Whole (or to the phenomenological essential insight), by doing so putting aside the limitations that conditio humana with its partiality and practical trivia lays upon us. Then again, presenting evil as an aesthetic phenomenon we design the kind of a virtual playground where we model it, counteract it and through this, finally establish our moral intuition on a new proven basis. Why is it so needed and reviving for us to create and use these psychological machines, not to mention the catharsis element they bring us, show some works of a prominent modern author Stephen King, the explorer of the theme of evil in the field of pop-culture. (shrink)

Night: The presence of the absence, the dissolution of the person in the night, the horror of being, the reality of the unreal, it takes us more to the absence of God than to God, to the absence of every entity. Dawn: Not being conscious of the existence of that unchangeable supposed centre of the person within time does not mean that we cannot be able to explain the not static changeable and relational personal identity in other ways. Day: (...) It is me who flows, but I am not in the flow like a support from where life flows, I am flowing in my own reality. This is not similar to an egology, it does not mean that everything exists and is loved to me, but it does mean that everything is seen and loved for me. (shrink)

Medieval philosophy redefined: the Latin age, c. 400-1635 -- The geography of the Latin age -- The fading light of antiquity: Neoplatonism and the tree of Porphyry, c. 3rd-5th cent. AD -- Founding fathers of the Latin Age: Augustine ([d.] 430) and Boethius ([d.] c. 525) -- The five centuries of darkness, c. 525-1025 -- Dawning of the main development : Anselm ([d.] 1109), Abaelard ([d.] 1142), Lombard ([d.] 1160) -- Enter Aristotle, c. 1150 -- Albert ([d.] 1280) and Aquinas (...) ([d.] 1274): focusing the challenge of reason -- After Aquinas ([d.] 1274) but before Fonesca ([d.] 1599): Bacon ([d.] 1292), Scotus ([d.] 1308), Ockham ([d.] 1349), D'Ailly ([d.] 1420), Soto ([d.] 1560) -- Poinsot's triumph (1632): the success and failure of the Latin Age -- The crash and burn of scholasticism, c. 1600-1650 -- After Poinsot ([d.] 1644): Peirce ([d.] 1914). (shrink)

The paper deals with the factors which enabled N. A. Vasiliev to put forward in 1910 - 12 the idea of logics free of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, the idea of metalogic and to construct his imaginary logic as novel non-classical system. It is shown that background of Vasiliev’s ideas lies deeply in Russia’s culture and particular approach to logical discourse. Several Russian scholars expressed ideas similar to Vasiliev’s though not in such explicit form. This period might (...) be called the prehistory of paraconsistency. Real history of paraconsistency starts with N.C.A. da Costa’s works. (shrink)

Contingencies of the early nuclear arms race Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9495-z Authors S. S. Schweber, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Science Center 371, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Alex Wellerstein, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Science Center 371, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Ethan Pollock, Department of History, Box N, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Barton J. Bernstein, History Department, Building 200, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2024, USA Michael D. Gordin, History (...) Department, 305 Dickinson Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

Cet article explore un point aveugle de la thèse d’Albert O. Hirschman dans Les passions et les intérêts : le topos du doux commerce aurait disparu des consciences au XIXe siècle en raison des conséquences sociales de la révolution industrielle. Pourtant, dans les débats qui animèrent les penseurs « industrialistes » sous la Restauration (1814-1830), l’association entre paix civile et développement économique prit de nouvelles formes topiques et argumentatives avec le passage conceptuel de la « nation commerçante » à la (...) « société industrielle ». Ce passage n’est pas neutre : il reconfigura la topographie du doux commerce. D’une part, le thème de l’industrie pacifique superposa au modèle de l’échange marchand (délibératif et plutôt égalitaire) celui de l’atelier productif (coopératif et plus hiérarchique). D’autre part, il ouvrit la perspective non plus d’un simple adoucissement, mais d’une substitution radicale de l’intérêt aux passions et d’une élimination totale du conflit par la paisible exploitation de la nature. Toutefois, l’émergence de la question sociale sema la discorde au sein des industrialistes : sans rejeter entièrement le lieu commun, les saint-simoniens se séparèrent des libéraux en détachant le thème de l’industrie pacifique du dogme de la libre concurrence. (shrink)

In 1934, Karl N. Llewellyn published a lively essay trumpeting the dawn of legal realism, "On Philosophy in American Law." The charm of his defective little piece is its style and audacity. A philosopher might be seduced into reading Llewellyn’s essay by its title; but one soon learns that by "philosophy" Llewellyn only meant "atmosphere". His concerns were the "general approaches" taken by practitioners, who may not even be aware of having general approaches. Llewellyn paired an anemic concept of (...) philosophy with a pumped-up conception of law. Llewellyn’s "law" included anything that reflects the "ways of the law guild at large" - judges, legislators, regulators, and enforcers. Llewellyn argued that the legal philosophies implicit in American legal practice had been natural law, positivism and realism, each adopted in response to felt needs of a time. We must reckon with many other implicit "philosophies" to understand the workings of the law guild, not the least of which has been racism. Others, maternalism and paternalism, my foci here, persist in American law, despite women’s progress toward equality. Both maternalism and paternalism were strikingly present in a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52  Reviews REPLY TO PINCOCK S S Philosophy / U. of Southern California Los Angeles,  -,  @. write to correct errors in Christopher Pincock’s review of my discussion of IRussell. First, according to Pincock, I attempt to “undermine Moore’s views on ethics in Part One, [and] Russell’s conception of analysis in Part Two” by charging them with a pre-Kripkean (...) conflation of necessity with apriority and analyticity. Not so. Although I do show that such conflation had negative consequences for the views of several philosophers, Moore and Russell are not among them. Moore’s error—which marred the defence of his thesis that conclusions about goodness are never consequences of purely descriptive premisses —was in tacitly assuming that all necessary/a priori relations among concepts arise from definitions (see my : –). A similar problem occurs in Russell, but only tangentially in connection with one possible route to his problematic principle () in Our Knowledge of the External World, the critique of which was not a part of any attack on his general conception of analysis (: –). () If the occurrence of sense-data constitutes verification of S, then S must be (at least partly) about sense-data.  Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. : The Dawn of Analysis (Princeton: Princeton U. P., ), pp. –.  Russell, n.s.  (winter –): – (at ).  Except when otherwise indicated, all references to OKEW will be to the revised,  Allen and Unwin edition. Although this was the edition I used in writing my chapter on OKEW, my bibliographical citation was a confused amalgam of different editions. The work was originally published in  by Open Court; there was a second printing in ; and in  Allen and Unwin re-issued it by purchasing extra sheets of the  printing, and binding them. In , Russell revised the work, which Allen and Unwin then published as a revised edition. That edition is identical to the Routledge paperback edition now in print and used by students. (Russell revised the  edition again for Norton’s  edition, which was reset for the Mentor paperback.) Except at one point, which I will identify later, the difference between the  and the  editions doesn’t affect my dispute with Pincock. Thanks to the editor, Kenneth Blackwell, for kindly sharing his extensive knowledge of the bibliographical history with me, and to Ross Scimeca, the head librarian at the incomparable Hoose Philosophy Library at , for furnishing me with copies of the editions I needed to sort this out. _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52 Reviews  Evidently, Pincock has confused the error about definition, which I expose, with a pre-Kripkean conflation of necessity with apriority and analyticity, which is not mentioned in Parts One and Two. This is a blunder. The advances in our understanding of crucial logical, semantic, epistemological, and modal notions which I identify as paramount achievements of the analytic tradition are not limited to those made by Kripke. To suggest otherwise is a distortion. Second, Pincock errs when he objects that in citing () as a source for the view that sense-data statements give the content of material-object statements, I ascribe “some form of latent verificationism” to Russell. If the objection is that Russell was no verificationist—since he didn’t hold that S is meaningful only if S is verifiable—the reply is that I never suggested otherwise. What I said is that () together with () Verification always consists in the occurrence of sense-data constituted a historical precursor to verificationism (: ). Perhaps, then, Pincock objects to my reconstruction of Russell’s argument: since (i) truths of physics and common sense are known by being verified, (ii) it follows from () and () that our knowledge of them is knowledge of sense-data. Perhaps, Pincock thinks that Russell would reject (i). Citing Russell … if there is any knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowledge of general truths which is independent of empirical evidence, i.e. does not depend upon the data of sense. (OKEW, pp. –; OKEW, p. ) Pincock concludes that scientific knowledge, for Russell, is justified partly by sense-data, and partly by associated logical principles about relations... (shrink)

In honor of Daniel Greenberger's 65th birthday, I record for posterity two superb examples of his wit, offer a proof of an important theorem on quantum correlations that even those of us over 60 can understand, and suggest, by trying to make it look silly, that invoking “quantum nonlocality” as an explanation for such correlations may be too cheap a way out of the dilemma they pose.

This paper examines the shareholder primacy norm as a widely acknowledged impediment to corporate social responsibility and explores the role of business schools in promoting the SPN but also potentially as an avenue for change by addressing misconceptions about shareholder primacy and the purpose of business. We start by explaining the SPN and then review its status under US and UK laws and show that it is not a likely legal requirement, at least under the guise of shareholder value maximization. (...) This is in contrast to the common assertion that managers are legally constrained from addressing CSR issues if doing so is inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders. Nonetheless, while the SPN might be muted as a legal norm, we show that it is certainly evident as a social norm among managers and in business schools—reflective, in part, of the sole voting rights of shareholders on corporate boards and of the dominance of shareholder theory—and justifiably so in the view of many managers and business academics. We argue that this view is misguided, not least when associated with claims of a purported legally enforceable requirement to maximize shareholder value. We propose two ways by which the influence of the SPN among managers might be attenuated: extending fiduciary duties of executives to non-shareholder stakeholders and changes in business school teaching such that it covers a plurality of conceptions of the purpose of the corporation. (shrink)

Galatea, or the Future of Darwinism W Russell Brain Originally published in 1927 "A brilliant exposition…of the evolutionary hypothesis." The Guardian "Should prove invaluable…" Literary Guide This non-technical but closely-reasoned book is a challenge to the orthodox teaching on evolution known as Neo-Darwinism. The author claims that although Neo-Darwinian theories can possibly account for the evolution of forms, they are quite inadequate to explain the evolution of functions. 88pp ************** Daedalus or Science and the Future J B S Haldane Originally (...) published in 1924. "The essay is brilliant. Sparkling with wit and bristling with challenges." British Medical Journal "Predicts the most startling changes." Morning Post This volume examines the future of scientific research from religious, philosophical social and economic standpoints. 94pp Automaton, or the Future of Mechanical Man H Stafford Hatfield Originally published in 1928 "It is impossible to do justice to his volume in a brief review…"Daily Herald At the time of original publication mankind’s chief inventions had been extensions of his senses or limbs. This work prophesies the dawn of an era in which substitutes will gradually be found even for the human brain. 96pp Gallio or the Tyranny of Science J W N Sullivan Originally published in 1927 "So packed with ideas it is not possible to give any adequate résumé of its contents." Times Literary Supplement "Remarkable monograph…devastating summary of materialism…" Spectator An attack on the values which science is so successfully imposing upon civilization. 90pp. (shrink)

Self destruction, inapprehensible an option as it might be, has been a challenging issue for philosophers and scholars since the dawn of time, forcing meditation into a vigorous and everlasting debate. The core question is: could suicide ever be deemed rational a choice? And if so, could it count as a moral alternative, if the circumstances call for it? The Stoics from Zeno up to Epictetus and Seneca regarded suicide as the ultimate resort, as the utmost opportunity for a (...) rational being to maintain his virtue, when all other bridges are burnt. For an act to be moral, it has to be deliberate, as well as the manifestation of an established evaluative hierarchy, however spontaneous and instantaneous might the latter be. In other words, a moral act is one that agents rationally opt for over other possible alternatives, on the subjective basis of their alleged best interests. Modern philosophers as Tom Beauchamp, Margaret Battin and Jacques Choron stress the criterion of rationality as a key issue regarding the ethics of suicide. Utilizing Rorty’s second definition of rationality, the article examines whether self destruction can be the outcome of proper evaluative assessment and deliberation, given that, as T. N. Pelegrinis suggests, such an evaluation seems to rest on a symmetry case, which might hardly be based on sound foundation. (shrink)

The communal composition and recitation of poems, as the marker of cultural distinction, constituted the central activities in the social networking of educated elites throughout premodern Korea. Poetry societies, therefore, had prospered in elite circles until the dawn of the modern period. This literary culture trickled down to nonelites during the late Chosŏn period. Some poetry societies of secondary status groups developed into centers of literary production in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Seoul; prominent yangban elites willingly joined them, and their events attracted (...) attention from poets across the country irrespective of their social status. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 201-207. “Poetry is experience, linked to a vital approach, to a movement which is accomplished in the serious, purposeful course of life. In order to write a single line, one must have exhausted life.” —Maurice Blanchot (1982, 89) Nikos Karouzos had a communist teacher for a father and an orthodox priest for a grandfather. From his four years up to his high school graduation he was incessantly educated, reading the entire private library of his granddad, comprising mainly (...) the Orthodox Church Fathers and the ancient classics. Later on in his life he sold the library for money, only to buy a little more time before he went broke again: “I carry sorrow like a cage/ I got no birds/ as I come back from her hair/ I see the profit emptied/ cool from terror.” (1993, Ι, 101) Nowadays—and ridiculously recently—we are more than apt to speak of a certain insouciance pertaining to the Greek form of expenditure: expenditure without any type of investment, sometimes not (even) symbolic. In the vaults of the European unconscious, this imprudent stance still conjures a “capital punishment” in the form of de-capitation, reflecting back the fear of excess and the terror of its consequences.1 Thus the Greek way of living is very close to what a stranger could have termed as “the Greek way of dying.” Yet, what is not often understood is that the Greek esprit , the same one that invented the maxim μηδ?ν ?γαν (“nothing in excess”), does not experience death solely as an imminent fear of bankruptcy. For it miraculously combines its unconditional acceptance with the promise of a resurrection that is always there in the scents of Spring, from Dionysus to the orthodox Christ: “Everyone resurrects himself through dying [….] Resurrection is the switching of mortalities.” (2002, 94) Hence, if an entire library was imprudently traded for a plate with seven olives, a sliced tomato and some fresh goat cheese, let us not be fooled: this is not the meal of the pauper, but that of “an aristocrat from God” (1993, II, 491) feeding his eloquent loudmouth, ridiculously cut open in an otherwise rock-solid caput . *** To speak of the Greek experience is to speak about a half-dead language that still utters in life what is seemingly excluded from it and thus forbidden to be talked about: death. Death as anything that is out of this world, as something that will never return . Still, along with an experience of death that recently waned as a worn-out academic fashion, the Greek experience is dead too. Nearly 2300 years of written words separating Homer from the fall of Byzantium equal 500 books on a library traded for money: “I am with the killed. Hence my deepest solitude. I do not feel this tremendous macho society, beyond from the fact that it is a ruthlessly consuming one. It is me who pays all the time .” (2002, 57) Let us do the math and see how much this dealing with the Greek experience is costing the poet and how much dealing with the Greek experience might cost us today. *** “I do not guarantee a single word.” (Karouzos, 1993, II, 454) Through its various dialects and forms, the Greek language speaks through an incessant historical dissemination. Anyone who is aware of this terrifying polymorphy and still calls himself a poet, must stand against a white sheet of paper, pen-in-hand, with a very particular duty: to be as fully inconsistent as possible. In the formally ironic uniqueness of the poem, the poet functions as “a band-aid for lesser and greater antinomies.” (1993, I, 251) Of course these antinomies are not exhausted in language—they are historical, political and, alas, existential. Yet, beyond appearances , it is language that ruthlessly encodes them through history, submitting the poet to the temptation of placing them one next to the other on a single white sheet. The closer their neighboring, the greater the scattering of the writer in the ironic uniqueness of the paper. In a work where poetic license is described as a “freedom-impasse” (2002, 51), this task is undertaken in full conscience of its personal consequences: “what I am interested in is to escape my individuality (envisioning the non-ego) […] Nevertheless, my dissociations never achieve duration.” (2002, 74-75) Hence, though poetry is the “deserted direction of will,” (1998, 62) the stance of the poet is not that of a Nietzschean “great man.”2 Whereas drunkenness provides a thread between the poem and the excess it both presupposes and infuses (“Poetry always enlarges. ‘Drunkenness’ is nothing more than that,” (2002, 85)), whereas language flashes in loudmouth spurts of déraison (“When I am alone I do something else. I utter words. For example, while having my ouzo and listening to music I am most likely capable of randomly shouting ‘Electricity!’” (2002, 138)), the poet never gives in to the double affirmation that would eventually risk the “element of pleasure in discourse.” (2002, 80)” It is exactly because the gap of the antinomies is so vast that poetry is not meant to be written with a hammer. Neither does writing consist in a reevaluation of those elements. In short, poetry is not an affirmation of difference, but the surprising beauty of chiming antinomies. We might never transcend them, but it is up to us to put them together. Yet again, this voisinage is not to be identified with the necessity of chance as an eternal return.4 On the contrary it is a return from that very return : Let us treat Yes as a No to No and No as a Yes […] And let us not forget that this pissed affirmation crumbled down Nietzsche’s intellect in the dark paths of this world. (2002, 88) This return from the “vicious circle” should in no way be taken as a form of artistic prudence. Rather it can be seen as a dribble of demonic inconsistency as Dionysus transforms himself into a Christ that is in turn de-theologized: “Who can forbid that? Every man is capable of his own theology, nothing can stop him.” (2002, 73-74) This is a turn towards an existential vision of the world, historically coinciding with a particular political defeat of the Left, to which the poet devoted all his life: after the defeat of the popular front I raised the question “why do we exist?” while others were asking “why we failed.” (2002, 57)5 But most of all it is a return to poetry that exceeds the existential question itself, going beyond the issue of faith. Poetry comes in as a question of return after a defeat that is confessed in full profanity. Though it accepts the necessity of the defeat, it does not affirm it. Though it negates it, the negation is not in the name of a promise to be delivered in the kingdom of heavens. Following a historical and existential defeat, poetry is born post mortem . It signals a return to Christ as “groundless religiousness in the surprise of the real as such” (2002, 72) which is at once a return to the refuge of childhood. It is not a question of endurance towards an eternal return. Rather it is a question on the possibility of an existential return. Returning in a world as someone who cannot enjoy any returns exactly because he is averse to guarantees. A return without returns. *** PHOTOCOPY OF HAPPINESS When I was young I used to pin down cicadas and step on ant nests. I used to stand there silent for hours. With threads I decapitated bees. Now I am a dead man breathing. (Karouzos, 1993, II, 336.) The return to the “paradise of childhood” (2002, 68) constitutes the devouring refuge of its own memory when defeat becomes the synonym of adulthood. The political struggles of a young communist in a country torn up by a civil war right after World War II fraught with incarcerations and exiles. Historically they resulted in the defeat of the communist movement in Greece and opened up a long turbulent road that would peak in the dictatorship of 1967. Existentially they led to a series of disillusionments: mental breakdown, divorce, abandonment of studies in law school. To the question “why do we exist” the answer was poetry. Still this exposé should not be read as a sweeping chronography of a man. For it actually happens to coincide with the historical fate of a nation that after its modern constitution never stopped dreaming of the glories of its past youth, in a present that was (and is) sweepingly disappointing. But isn’t this return to youth finally a way of compensating for a loss of youth that necessarily results in a losing adulthood? Will Greeks, the eternal children of Plato and Nietzsche, ever learn? How to return without dying, how to remember without wasting time? WE ARE IN THE OPEN MEANING Living the coldest mauve night right across Parthenon I went to take a piss on some foliage and I was enjoying the foliage as it was steaming. (Karouzos, 1993, II, 340) Beyond the historical tragedies of modern Greece and away from any personal disappointments, the relation that this land holds with language and history is mediated through the Greek light—whose omnipresence is the very condition of its transcendence. All historical contradictions from Dionysus to Christ took place under this light; all those disseminated dialects were spoken beneath its warmth. To paraphrase Lévinas,6 light is both the condition of the world and of our withdrawal from it—a withdrawal towards the invisibility of God, of the dead, of meta-physics, resulting from the temptation that all is still here, behind this light the visibility of which they once evaded: “birds, the allurement of God.” (1993, I, 17) Under that luminous sky, if Greeks can do anything at all, it is to envision a return that will never come. All they can do is write poetry—which is doing nothing; other than lending an ear to a disseminated language whispering a unity that cannot be promised, as an adulthood in defeat is ready to recognize. Trying “to trap the invisible in visibility” (1993, II, 483) they forget that they have grown up and one day they die—with the promise of return. Hence an additional meaning must be given to this return to childhood. It does not signal salvation but rather its promise. To the ears of an aged continent it means that the return to/of poetry is a losing game, a return without returns. “Europe, Europe… you are nothing more than the continuation of Barabbas.” (1993, I, 295) *** “Life is not there to verify theories.”7 The records show that Karouzos was finally given a second-class pension from the Greek government, at the time when he was being recognized by the literary press as one of Greece’s major contemporary poets. Being neither a bourgeois nor a nobelist, he proclaimed himself to be an anarcho-communist, unconditionally faithful to the utopia of a classless society. He also drank, heavily. “Capitalism made an animal out of man/ Marxism made an animal out of truth/ Shut up.” (1993, II, 369) Perhaps one of the most scandalous divides of our times has been the one between the living and the dead, the latent prohibition that the living should not be concerned with the dead based on the mere impossibility of the dead to be concerned with the living in the first place. What adds to this scandal is that this divide abuses anything that cannot return to us by subsuming it under the same futility. Hence death is no longer “loss” in the usual sense. It no more refers to the things we lost but to our “loss” (of time, money and well-being) as we insist to dwell on them. Death is a waste —of time. It is this waste that we find in the insouciance of Greek expenditure; the waste in dealing with a language that most of its historical part is no longer spoken (a dead language); the waste in translating a poet who is ex definitio untranslatable; the waste of his vision, his money, his life. The waste of dealing with anything that cannot return and that cannot bring in any returns . But it is also the waste of life that poetry itself presupposes, the waste of dealing with invisibility, with anything that is out of this world and thus invokes the fear of death that is in turn—and surprisingly— nowhere to be found. Instead of death, what is there, beyond the light, is the being without us (to recall the Lévinasian il y a ), the mumble of our own nothingness which constitutes the price to be paid for writing poetry under an evergreek light. To understand this to-and-fro, is to realize that poetry is something out of this world that nevertheless takes place in this world, by virtue of this world. But to ridiculously equate this to-and-fro with death as non-existence, is to exile poetry along with its own possibility from this same old world: I do not believe that poetry will ever disappear from this world. […] But I am also sure that it does not have many chances of playing, as you say, a redemptive role in our vertiginous technological future. Without being endangered as a creative need, it will be placed on the side of history. (2002, 32) It is mainly there that we would like to locate the meaning of Nikos Karouzos’s poetry today. If we are willing to include the Greek original it is because we consider that it will be both a waste of time for us to do so (since most of you cannot read Greek) and because it might induce you to the even larger waste of learning it. We would additionally be glad if this small introduction served as an equally wasteful, academically useless piece of reading, gesturing towards a taboo of investing in anything Greek—that is in anything dead among the living, in anything that will never come back and maybe was never here in the first place. This is the only way to reserve for ourselves the possibility of poetry and preserve the light of its promise. “To return: that is the miracle.” (1993, I, 17) Athens, Greece July 10, 2011 NOTES 1 “ Capitale (a Late Latin word based on caput “head”) emerged in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries in the sense of funds, stock of merchandise, sum of money or money carrying interest.[…] The word and the reality it stood for appear in the sermons of St. Bernardino of Siena (1380-1444) ‘… quamdam seminalem rationem lucrosi quam communiter capitale vocamus ’, ‘that prolific cause of wealth that we commonly call capital’” (Braudel, 1992, 232-233). 2 “A great man – a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style – what is he? First : there is a long logic in all of his activity, hard to survey because of its length, and consequently misleading; he has the ability to extend his will across great stretches of his life and to despise and reject everything petty about him, including even the fairest, ‘divinest’ things in the world.” (Nietzsche, 1968, 505, §962) 3 Cf. Deleuze, 1986, 186-9. 4 “Return is the being of becoming, the unity of multiplicity, the necessity of chance: the being of difference as such or the eternal return.” (Deleuze, 189)5 In this 1982 interview Karouzos refers to the defeat of the communist movement in Greece after the civil war of 1946-1949 between the Governmental Army and the Democratic Army of Greece, the military division of the Greek communist party. Karouzos’s father was a member of the communist National Liberation front (EAM) members of which formed the mainl resistance movement (ELAS) in Greece during WWII. The poet was a member of the United Panhellenic Organization of Youth (EPON), which was a youth division of EAM. After the end of the war, ELAS was called to disarmament in view of the formation of a National Army. The members of EAM resigned from the government of national unity and a series of protests led to a 3 year civil war between ELAS and the Government Army. After the defeat of ELAS the Communist party was outlawed and many communists were exiled in deserted Greek islands. Karouzos, who took action in the Greek resistance and was active during the Greek civil war, was exiled in Icaria on 1947 and in Makronisos on 1953 where he was called two years earlier to do his military service. 6 “Existence in the world qua light, which makes desire possible, is then, in the midst of being, the possibility of detaching oneself from being. To enter into being is to link up with objects; it is in effect a bond that is already tainted with nullity. It is already to escape anonymity. In this world where everything seems to affirm our solidarity with the totality of existence, where we are caught up in the gears of a universal mechanism, our first feeling, our ineradicable illusion, is a feeling or illusion of freedom. To be in the world is this hesitation, this interval in existing, which we have seen in the analyses of fatigue and the present.” (Lévinas, 1988,43-4) 7from a TV interview. THE POETRY OF NIKOS KAROUZOS From Redwriter [ Ερυθρογρ?φος ], in Collected Works, Vol . II, Athens: Ikaros. 1993, 463-4. [Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 9-10.] JESUS ANTI-OEDIPUS* Why were we once saving till the fifth day the Paschal lamb? The scriptures say: with this victim’s meat we ought to cleanse all of our senses. To give life to the whitest wave miraculous odors in the extension of the chest. Ideals to death. For us to witness the illustrious dawns of Absinthe and for the soul to be a deeply carved ornament on the fore we named will. Then many deer running amidst the evergreen growth with watery hymns, then, the unintended angels descending with heights spiraling in their momentum offer themselves to the luminous Adventure. Whence the need for speech and our sufferings covered with flags like the glorified dead. An incorporeal finger pointing at the flamboyant and fragrant holocausts within the tired horizons and the exhausted breadths with joys of the mistletoe on fire and shivering all of the green-leaved love. Something would have chirped again had we not driven it away— maybe the ewe’s grass. Something would have called us to the eternal resurrection— maybe the grace of spring. But now our heart is fiercely blinded, withdrawn to the appearances of Hades. Silence and ice incessantly cover the Infant Spirit in thatched times. While the cherry trees are dreaming faintly glowing in absolute darkness there’s nothing the Babylonians can contemplate in labs with automatic colored lights. How to rejoice now in the fifth day of the lamb? We have forked the stars. We’ve gradually become supposedly sublime with plucked chimeras in our hands. Avenged relentlessly by science. *Though the poem appears in a 1990 collection, it was actually written in 1968. Hence the reader must be aware in not associating Karouzos’ Anti-Oedipus with the famous 1972 work of Deleuze and Guattari, given that the former precedes the latter. ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΑΝΤΙ-ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ Γιατ? κρατο?σαμε κ?ποτε ?ς την π?μπτη μ?ρα το πασχαλιν? πρ?βατο; Τα κε?μενα λ?νε: μ’ αυτο? του θ?ματος το κρ?ας ?πρεπε να καθαρ?σουμε ?λες τις αισθ?σεις. Για να δ?σουμε κ?μα στη ζω? λευκ?τατο θαυμ?σιες ευωδι?ς στην ?κταση του στ?θους. Ιδανικ? στο χ?ρο. Για να βλ?πουμε τα λαμπρ? χαρ?ματα του ?ψινθου και να ’ναι η ψυχ? στ?λισμα βαθυχ?ρακτο της πλ?ρης που την ε?παμε θ?ληση. Τ?τε πολλ?ς δορκ?δες τρ?χοντας αν?μεσα στην καταπρ?σινη φ?ση με τους υδ?τινους ?μνους, τ?τε, κατεβα?νοντας οι αθ?λητοι ?γγελοι με κυλινδο?μενο το ?ψος στην ορμ? τους χαρ?ζονται της αστραφτερ?ς Περιπ?τειας. ?θεν η μιλι? γι’ αυτ? χρει?ζεται και τα δειν? σκεπ?ζονται ωσ?ν τους τιμημ?νους νεκρο?ς με σημα?ες. Ασ?ματο δ?χτυλο δε?χνει τα φλογ?δη και μοσχοβ?λα ολοκαυτ?ματα στους κουρασμ?νους ορ?ζοντες στα εξουθενωμ?να πλ?τη καθ?ς αν?βουν οι χαρ?ς του νερα?δ?ξυλου και τρ?μει ολ?κληρη η πρασιν?φυλλη αγ?πη. Κ?τι θα κελαηδο?σε π?λι αν δεν το δι?χναμε— μπορε? της προβατ?νας το χορτ?ρι. Κ?τι θα μας καλο?σε στην απ?ραντη αν?σταση— μπορε? του ?αρος η χ?ρη. Μα η καρδι? μας ?γρια τυφλ?θηκε π?ρασε στα φαιν?μενα του ?δη. Σιγ? και π?γος αδι?κοπα σκεπ?ζει στους αχυρ?νιους καιρο?ς το Ν?πιο Πνε?μα. Την ?ρα που ονειρε?ονται οι βυσσινι?ς και λ?μπουν αμυδρ? μεσ’ στο απλ?τατο σκοτ?δι τ?ποτα δε στοχ?ζονται οι βαβυλ?νιοι στα εργαστ?ρια με τ’ αυτ?ματα χρωματιστ? φ?τα. Π?ς να χαρο?με πια την π?μπτη μ?ρα του προβ?του; Φουρκ?σαμε τ’ αστ?ρια. Γ?ναμε σιγ?-σιγ? δ?θεν υπ?ροχοι με μαδημ?νες χ?μαιρες στα χ?ρια. Μας ν?μεται σκληρ? η επιστ?μη. From: Redwriter [Ερυθρογρ?φος], in Collected Works, Vol. II, Athens: Ikaros. 1993, 472. [Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 18.] DIALECTΙCS OF SPRING Christ the straight angle; Christ the Pythagorean theorem. Christ the infinitesimal calculus from above the blessed Sets Christ. Christ the tessellation of massive particles Christ the zero mass. Hence we spray numbers and fields of lust. We are carabineers of diseased logic plus something— Observed means observer and Hekate The darkness luminous and light in the dark Astarte banqueters demons from today. ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΑΡΟΣ Χριστ?ς η ορθ? γων?α· Χριστ?ς το πυθαγ?ριο θε?ρημα. Χριστ?ς ο απειροστικ?ς λογισμ?ς ?νωθεν ?λβια Χριστ?ς τα Σ?νολα. Χριστ?ς η ψηφιδογραφ?α στα μαζικ? σωμ?τια Χριστ?ς η μ?ζα μηδ?ν. ?ρα ψεκ?ζουμε αριθμο?ς και πεδ?α λαγνε?ας. Ε?μαστε τυφεκιοφ?ροι νοσο?σης λογικ?ς και κ?τι-- παρατηρο?μενο σημα?νει παρατηρητ?ς και Εκ?τη σκ?τος το π?μφωτο και φως εν τ? σκοτ?? η Αστ?ρτη συνδαιτημ?νες δα?μονες απ’ ?ρτι. From: Redwriter [Ερυθρογρ?φος], Athens: Apopeira, 1990, 18. [1993, II, 472]. CREDO (as we are used to say in Latin) Α I believe in one Poet expelled from heavens / fugitive from the god and vagabond, Empedocles / and here on earth / exile on the earth etc. of Baudelaire /. Β I believe in one Computer inside thunder and through matter. Γ Suffering undefiled / substantive / the Poet uplifts himself slow-burning suicidal implying lengthy sleeps. Δ Cutting down on prospective mistakes. Ε Of all things visible and invisible officiating the onion-peelings. Ζ The Poet has nothing / see the departed /. Η I believe in one Poet that says: madness I enjoy; he ridicules existence; let me light up from my mana. Θ Syntax he doesn’t care about when musicality commands him. Along with still more licenses, and Ts are played according to the concept sound anywhere. E.g. the winters here, he winters there; it will not come—I will not rest, etc. etc. Ι The Poet exercises thought until it’s stripped down. Κ And if he’s Greek he must always study the fineness of Attica, in light, mountains, fields and sea. For this fineness teaches language. Λ And if he’s deeply destined the Poet expresses the unexplainable of the explained; he happens to be a rightful heir to the scientist and his predecessor. Μ On the froth he does not last; the Poet blusters at the bottom of the pot. Ν Flamebred and never redeemed. Ξ The Poet must sometimes say: what a consumption of presence — be a bit lonely for a change! Ο The Poet is twilit. Π He is susceptible of deaths and resurrections. Ρ He looks from the corner of his eye and exists in a glance. Σ He follows behind the mother. Τ Eveningless when it comes to age. Υ I believe in one Poet who says: let the purities coincide. Until the Corinth of the Universe or even further. Φ In a higher despair. Χ In a brighter quintessence. Ψ In one sensation that lifts off. Ω Forgiving everyone. CREDO (ως ε?θισται να λ?με λατινιστ?) Α Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν εκτ?ς ουρανο? / φυγ?ς θε?θεν και αλ?της, Εμπεδοκλ?ς / και επ? της γης / εξ?ριστος π?νω στη γη κ.λπ. του Βωδελα?ρου /. Β Πιστε?ω εις ?να Υπολογιστ?ν εντ?ς κεραυνο? και δια της ?λης. Γ Υποφ?ροντας ?χραντα / ουσιαστικ?ν / ο Ποιητ?ς ανατε?νεται βραδυφλεγ?ς αυτ?χειρας εξυπακο?οντας πολ?ωρους ?πνους. Δ Τα υποψ?φια λ?θη λιγοστε?οντας. Ε Ορατ?ν τε π?ντων και αορ?των ιερουργ?ντας την αποκρομμ?ωση. Ζ Ο Ποιτ?ς ?χει τ?ποτα / βλ?πε τους αναχωρ?σαντες /. Η Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν που λ?ει: η τρ?λα μ’ αρ?σει· γελοιοποιε? την ?παρξη· ας αν?ψω απ’ τη μ?να μου. Θ Συνταχτικ? δεν το γνοι?ζεται στην προσταγ? της μουσικ?τητας. Μαζ? και μ’ ?λλες ακ?μη λευτερι?ς, και τα νυ πα?ζονται κατ? την ?ννοια ?χος οπουδ?ποτε. Π.χ. τον χειμ?να εδ?, το χειμ?να εκε?· δε θ? ’ρθει – δεν θα καταλαγι?σουμε, κ. λπ. κ.λπ. Ι Ο Ποιητ?ς γυμν?ζει τη σκ?ψη σε απογ?μνωση. Κ Κι αν ε?ναι ?λληνας οφε?λει να σπουδ?ζει π?ντοτε της Αττικ?ς τη λεπτ?τητα, σε φως, βουν?, χωρ?φια και θ?λασσα. Διδ?σκει γλ?σσα η λεπτ?τητα το?τη. Λ Κι αν ε?ναι βαθι? πεπρωμ?νος ο Ποιητ?ς εκφρ?ζει το ανεξ?γητο του εξηγητο?· τυγχ?νει ν?μιμος δι?δοχος του επιστ?μονα και προκ?τοχ?ς του. Μ Στον αφρ? δεν ?χει δι?ρκεια· στο πατοκ?ζανο μα?νεται ο Ποιητ?ς. Ν Φλογοδ?αιτος και ποτ? ξελυτρωμ?νος. Ξ Ο Ποιητ?ς κ?ποτε πρ?πει να λ?ει: μεγ?λη καταν?λωση παρουσ?ας – γενε?τε και λ?γο μοναξι?ρηδες! Ο Ο Ποιητ?ς ε?ναι αμφ?φλοξ. Π Επιδ?χεται θαν?τους και αναστ?σεις. Ρ Ακροθωρ?ζει και υπ?ρχει σε ξαφνοκο?ταγμα. Σ Ε?ναι ουραγ?ς της μητ?ρας. Τ Αν?σπερος απ? ηλικ?α. Υ Πιστε?ω εις ?να Ποιητ?ν που λ?ει: να συμπ?σουν οι αγν?τητες. Μ?χρι την Κ?ρινθο του Σ?μπαντος ? μακρ?τερα. Φ Σε αν?τερη απελπισ?α. Χ Σε φαειν?τερη πεμπτουσ?α. Ψ Σε μια α?σθηση που πτηνο?ται. Ω Συγχωρ?ντας τους π?ντες. From Large Sized Logic [ Λογικ? μεγ?λου σχ?ματος ], Athens: Erato, 1989, n.p. [1993, II, 521-3]. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 136-140. In early 2011, Cow Heavy Books published The Official Catalog of the Library of Potential Literature , a compendium of catalog 'blurbs' for non-existent desired or ideal texts. Along with Erinrose Mager, I edited the project, in a process that was more like curation as it mainly entailed asking a range of contemporary writers, theorists, and text-makers to send us an entry. What resulted was a creative/critical hybrid anthology, a small book in which each page opens (...) to a new iteration of textual desire. These texts explore the material possibilities of the book. Somewhat parallel to the call of N. Katherine Hayles who, in her book Writing Machines , urges literary theorists to take up the practice of Medium Specific Analysis (to account for the way the medium in which it is presented conditions or at least bears on a literary text). I see in the imagined works of The Official Catalog a call for the innovative writers of today to become Medium-Responsive. This would mean thinking through the specific (materially constrained) possibilities offered by the media in which texts are presented, and in thinking of the literary text as a kind of art in the greater context of other arts and the book as a medium situated within the context of many other media. In doing so, the contemporary writer refutes the chorus of critics who lament the death of the book by consistently reinvigorating literary innovation. The following are selections from The Official Catalog of the Library of Potential Literature that show possible paths for (thinking about) new writing that engages with its medium. —Ben Segal, Editor THE CUBE Even the most radical non-linear texts have tended to exploit or subvert only the sequential possibilities of print—from the continuous loop of Joyce's Finnegans Wake to the shuffled cards of Marc Saporta's Composition No. 1 —but The Cube takes such multiplicities to an entirely new level. Set in a grid, the book's words can be read conventionally, across the page, as well as down each column—with either route making complete grammatical sense. But they can also be read as stacked strata and mined like lexical core samples through the layered pages of the book. Each path tells the same story from a different perspective (the narrative, naturally, hinges on the potential outcomes of a throw of cubed dice). By opening up the z-axis to reading in this way, The Cube recognizes the book as a three-dimensional sculptural space. Taking its lead from Armand Schwerner's (If Personal) and Raymond Queneau's Cent mille milliards de poèmes , The Cube reads like a experiment by Christian Bök precision printed by Emily McVarish. Craig Dworkin is the editor, most recently, of The Consequence of Innovation: 21st Century Poetics (Roof Books, 2008), The Sound of Poetry/The Poetry of Sound , with Marjorie Perloff (U. Chicago Press, 2009), and Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing , with Kenneth Goldsmith (Northwestern UP, 2010). He teaches at the University of Utah. HE GOES In He Goes , we read notes, letters and e-mails from a scholar father to his novelist daughter. We read of the father's musings on Beckett, on Pinter, on Anne Frank; his description of a woman hanging laundry from a line. We read about his journey toward dying, followed by a brief, third person account of his death, and his obituary. Then a long series of blank pages that demand to be read in real time, non-sentence by non-sentence, blank page by blank page. Finally—and it is here that this peculiar little book begins to soar—the dead father writes to his as-of-yet-still-living daughter. He does not write from death. He does not write from life. The words unprint, unstamp, unkindle. Still, they require no translation. The father "writes" (for lack of a better word) about the serendipitous, the commonplace; he recommends another book. He jokes. He asks his daughter how her stomach is. He says forget about presence in absence, darling; screw words as memorial and the guys in garbage cans and loss as redemption and I can't go on I must go on. He goes, "Love, Fodder." He goes, "incidentally." He goes, "I thought you might like to know." Elizabeth Graver is the author of a story collection, Have You Seen Me? , and three novels: Unravelling ; The Honey Thief ; and Awake . Her work has been anthologized in Best American Short Stories , Best American Essays , and Prize Stories: the O. Henry Awards . She teaches at Boston College. THE PAPER ARCHIVIST A stunning package and a triumph of imagination, The Paper Archivist at times looks to be less a book than an abstract expressionist painting. Softly bound, its contents unfold to a single sheet of uneven thickness and texture—a canvas splattered with colored lines, stickers, broken sentences, and nonsense pictographs. But by following the directions to fold, dip, smell, rub, scratch, and tear the sheet according to the contingencies of the weather and using only the objects at hand, the reader slowly brings the forces hidden in the noise into a glorious sculptural convergence, processing a different story and shape each time. This is the rare book that continues to stir, whirl, and pop on every new reading. Sean Higgins blogs at BOMBlog where he is responsible for the column Volumes and Territories, as well as Ghost Island , a fledgling collaborative intellectual collective. THE SLOW BOOK The Slow Book , written by an anonymous author at the dawn of literacy, on a minor planet (otherwise notable only as the source of that exceptionally hardy, not very tasty grain called “shef” sowed on hostile planets as an early step to colonization), and encoded into a series of punctures on a strip of copper coiled inside a clever device, something between a player piano and an old-fashioned film projector, is being released into print, as was the author’s intention, at a rate of one word per century (local time). Each word is, across the Forty Galaxies, agreed to be uncannily apt for the century in which it appears—even “of,” in a century during which the highest value was attached to fidelity, whether to ideals, worlds, or romantic love; even “the,” which governed two centuries, one extraordinarily materialistic, during which advances in propulsion and navigation accelerated the exchange of exceptional objects between the remotest planets of the Forty, and one in which the central concern, both of philosophers and the common man, was whether, in an age of rapidly proliferating hypothetical worlds, anyone or anything concretely existed at all. Even those words published long before interstellar contact can be seen in retrospect to have transgalactic pertinence. As a result, attempts to abstract the machine from its publishers, Hobson & Hui, in order to “predict the future” for insight or gain by “fast- forwarding” the copper strip have been many and ingenious. While, in centuries of skepticism (“maybe”), or of unrest (“go”) the book has been nearly forgotten, in others it seems to haunt every thought, every deed, despite the fact that the subject of The Slow Book is still unclear. So far only a few sentences exist in print; everyone knows them, can quote them, offer the standard exegeses and assorted heresies; yet certainties are the stuff of adolescence; mature readers are forced to acknowledge that these sentences are probably only a preamble to the main argument. They contain no proper nouns, nor can we identify any definite theme. There is even disagreement about their tone, whether coolly ironic, as some insist, or ardent. The appearance of an unusual grammatical case, sometimes called the future pluperfect continuous, used to describe events that at some future point will have always been true (but are not yet)—hitherto known to appear only in the synthetic dogmas of the Thanatographical Society, and in certain highly circumscribed religious contexts—has suggested to some scholars that the Slow Book was originally intended for ritual use, but the proximity of the usage to a term designating a small hand plow that, as Pott and Mielcke have convincingly shown, would have borne a distinctly obscene double meaning in its culture of origin in the author’s time, argues otherwise. It is likewise unclear whether the situation that seems to be—with teasing incompleteness—sketched out in these few lines is intended as an illustration of general principles, a case study, a dramatic scene, or an extended metaphor. In short, we have no idea what The Slow Book is about. In our own time, we believe that it is almost certainly a work of fiction, but that may be because we live in the century of “if”. In each age, perhaps, we see the book we most need to read. Some have dared to suggest that the metal strip is blank until, with millennial fanfare, it advances into its new position, that no ur-text exists, that the book itself is brought into being—written—by our need. But that is exactly the sort of thing we would believe, in 7645. Shelley Jackson is the author of the story collection The Melancholy of Anatomy , the novel Half Life , and hypertexts including Patchwork Girl . The recipient of a Howard Foundation grant, a Pushcart Prize, and the 2006 James Tiptree Jr Award, she has also written and illustrated several children's books, including The Old Woman and the Wave ; Sophia, the Alchemist's Dog ; and Mimi's Dada Catifesto . Her stories and essays have appeared in Conjunctions , McSweeney's , The Paris Review , and Cabinet Magazine . In 2004 she launched her project SKIN , a story published in tattoos on 2095 volunteers. THE BOOK OF SOUNDS The Book of Sounds is just that: a book of sounds made when letters are construed in new ways to bring forth out of the alphabet new forms of speech. A book meant to be read out loud, The Book of Sounds is not unlike Laurie Anderson's O Superman or Brian Eno's Music for Airports in its attempt to make music out of the most primary and simplest of methods. It breaks language down to its barest bones and makes out of the page a drum that has never before been beaten upon. Peter Markus is the author of a novel, Bob, or Man on Boat (Dzanc Books) as well as two books of short fiction, Good, Brother and The Singing Fish , both of which were published by Calamari Press. A new collection of stories, We Make Mud , is now available from Dzanc Books. PARADISE OF THE BLIND by Celan Solen Although the reclusive Celan Solen published his first and only book in 1963—paying out-of-pocket for a limited edition of the slim collection No One May Have the Same Knowledge Again —he remained in American obscurity for almost three decades. In 1992 a micro-press in Istanbul brought out No One in Turkish. A German translation followed in 1995. Soon it became clear in literary circles Solen was a world-class (if highly unclassifiable) artist—lyrical, dense, enigmatic—who could undo the conventional short story in 397 words by inventing impossible worlds housed in impossible whirls (in “Small Sadnesses,” a single chartreuse tree frog in Borneo unknowingly holds time together by its very presence in the universe, while each letter of its tale refers, not to itself, but to the one preceding it in the alphabet). By his disappearance last year, Solen was considered master by a generation of writers and critics (except, alas, for those gentlemen in the Swedish Academy). Imagine, then, that generation’s delight at the discovery, locked away in the author’s safe-deposit box, of his second and final composition. Had Lynch’s Lost Highway been book instead of film, and had it been penned by Beckett at his least certain, revised by Barthelme at his most formally deranged, and typeset by Derrida at his most semiotically catastrophic, the result might have been something like Paradise of the Blind : interlacing narratives of a man composed of borrowed organs (whose most cheerless and difficult to locate, god, could only have been invented by an empty heart), a nonexistent medieval painting blamed for the ruin of future hope, and the spread of a philosophy that holds earth a mistake constantly recurring in the dream of a fish lying on the floor of the Atlantic (if the fish wakes, our world winks off)—all contained in a text packed with typed-over passages, torn postcards, poems that can be deciphered only when held up to a mirror, pages ornamented with trompe-l'œil paperclips and coffee stains and buzzing houseflies, some busy with illegible runes that dissolve when exposed to light, three that smell like roses or lemons (depending on whether a man or woman is reading), two that stain with the bloody fingerprints of the those who handle them, one that ignites when brushed with breath, thirteen sewn from baby skin, one that moans when touched, and one that screams—yet all without mass, unimaginable, and invisible. Lance Olsen is author of more than 20 books of and about innovative fiction, including, most recently, the novels Calendar of Regrets (2010) and Head in Flames (2009). He teaches experimental narrative theory and practice at the University of Utah. SUPERSTRUCTURE! by Barbara D'Albi As soon as I opened the third drawer of Barbara D'Albi's wooden novel, everything became hopeless. Now in Ithaca, there was no going back. And it wasn't just the intricate series of shelves, hinged doors and locked drawers which D'Albi layered into the book, no, lo, I was constructed anew by the story. Who else but D'Albi to imagine a God who becomes a carpenter and gets killed?! And makes it good! You want stories? D'Albi is a skyscraper, built with planes and levers. Momentarily I wondered where I could shelve this book, and then I thought: no matter; I couldn't put it down. Adam Robinson lives in Baltimore, where he runs Publishing Genius. He is the author of Adam Robison and Other Poems and Say, Poem. 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Robert Merton may not remember it, but in the 1930s we met in Cambridge and took one or more walks together – 1 think they were along Trapelo Road in Waltham, then a rural lane. Our conversation must have been interesting, since I remember the episode, but I can only guess at the subject. Since Merton was working on the sociology of science in Newton's day and I had a long standing interest in the relations between mathematics and society, especially (...) at the dawn of capitalism, it is very likely that we discussed the Hessen paper of 1931, published inScience at the Cross Roads. The paper had impressed me, as it had impressed several British scientists of the younger generation, including J. D. Bernal and Joseph Needham; Merton's dissertation, when it appeared, showed that Hessen's “provocative essay” had made its impression on his work as well. It also showed that he was aware of some of the oversimplifications of the Hessen lecture, as was G. N. Clark (see Clark 1937a; Clark 1937b, chap. 3). The almost total omission of the religious factor was one of them. (shrink)

Einstein's gravitational field equations in empty space outside a massive plane with infinite extension give a class of solutions describing a field with flat spacetime giving neutral, freely moving particles an acceleration. This points to the necessity of defining the concept “gravitational field” not simply by the nonvanishing of the Riemann curvature tensor, but by the nonvanishing of certain elements of the Christoffel symbols, called the physical elements, or the nonvanishing of the Riemann curvature tensor. The tidal component of a (...) gravitational field is associated with a nonvanishing Riemann tensor, while the nontidal components are associated with nonvanishing physical elements of the Christoffel symbols. Spacetime in a nontidal gravitational field is flat. Such a field may be separated into a homogeneous and a rotational component. In order to exhibit the physical significance of these components in relation to their transformation properties, coordinate transformations inside a given reference frame are discussed. The mentioned solutions of Einstein's field equations lead to a metric identical to that obtained as a result of a transformation from an inertial frame to a uniformly accelerated frame. The validity of the strong principle of equivalence in extended regions for nontidal gravitational fields is made clear. An exact calculation of the weight of an extended body in a uniform gravitational field, from a global point of view, gives the result that its weight is independent of the position of the scale on the body. (shrink)

One of the endearing traits of Asher Peres is that when somebody publishes something he knows to be wrong, he does not bother to refute it, even if the paper criticizes his own work. Life is too brief for such frivolity. As a small 70th birthday present I would like to answer one such recent attack. It’s not much of a present, since Asher will not read my paper. Why should he? He already knows this criticism is nonsense. But somebody (...) has to set the written record straight for future historians, so I will do it as part of this celebration. Fortunately this particular issue is so easily settled that this can be a very short paper. Since Asher is a master of the very short paper, my Peresian brevity is an important part of my act of homage. The criticism I address can be found in a new formulation by Karl Hess and Walter Philipp(1) of their view that all versions of Bell’s theorem are fundamentally flawed. I focus here only on their criticism of the version in Asher’s book.(2). (shrink)

The importance of seminal plasma in fertilization was appreciated as early as 1677 and would thus hardly seem a source for the search of antibacterial agents. The observation that seminal plasma had the ability to inhibit the growth of microorganisms in 1940 led to a systematic search for molecules possessing antimicrobial activity in addition to factors that might have a role in reproductive physiology. Extensive investigations led to the discovery in bovine seminal fluid of a 47‐residue peptide, possessing potent antimicrobial (...) activity as well as calcium transport modulatory properties in bovine sperm. We describe in this article the two, apparently unrelated, biological activities of this peptide. (shrink)

A contribution to the sixth installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Apology for Quietism,” this article compares the worldview of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes) and the quietism that it presumably entails to the early Wittgenstein's worldview and his quietism. The first section of the article treats a relevant paradox in the worldview of the early Wittgenstein: his positive exhortations for certain types of speech and silence, for certain types of action and inaction, seem in conflict with his statement that, in the world, (...) “there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value.” The second section examines an internal paradox in the worldview of Qoheleth, who commends the enjoyment of a world that he considers meaningless and vain. The third and final section of the article compares these paradoxes as constitutive of the texts in which they appear. Conveying no univocal message, while both writers exhibit quietism, they also gesture toward kinds of speech and action. (shrink)

The essay replies to comments by Finnis, Gardner and Endicott, on my book, Law as a Moral Idea. It is questioned whether Finnis is right to suggest that governance by law is a requirement of justice. It is suggested that Hart's positivism may have rested upon an unduly private conception of morality. Gardner's suggestion that Law as a Moral Idea falsely manufactures disagreement with Hart is rejected, principally by pointing out that Gardner focuses upon only one issue, where the book (...) already acknowledges that Hart might conceivably agree, and ignores other issues where the disagreement with Hart seems indisputable. In response to Endicott, it is acknowledged that 'politics' could be understood as a moral idea comparable to the idea of 'law', but denied that this robs either thesis of interest. The nature of doctrinal reasoning and law's justificatory force is then discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth CenturyA. P. MartinichScott Soames. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Vol. 1, The Dawn of Analysis. Pp. xix + 411. Vol. 2, The Age of Meaning. Pp. xxii + 479. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Cloth, $35.00, each volume.This two-volume work treats Anglo-American analytic philosophy from 1900 to roughly 1970. This means that the views of Michael Dummett, John Rawls and others (...) are not treated. Soames explains the omission in an epilogue to the second volume. Too much good philosophy on too many topics has been done recently—much of it using technical devices—to allow him or anyone else, to master more than a few parts. That seems right to me.The first volume consists of five parts: One: G. E. Moore on Ethics, Epistemology, and Philosophical Analysis; Two: Bertrand Russell on Logical and Linguistic Analysis; Three: Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus; and Four: Logical Positivism, Emotivism, and Ethics; and Five: The Post-Positivist Perspective of the Early W. V. Quine. The great figure associated with twentieth-century analytic philosophy who is missing from Volume 1, Gottlob Frege, Soames omits, because Frege's "concerns were, on the whole, more specialized and technical than the others, and for many years this limited his influence" (1:xiii n. 1). The second volume consists of seven parts: One: Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations; Two: Classics of Ordinary Language Philosophy: Truth, Goodness, the Mind, and Analysis; Three: More Classics of Ordinary Language Philosophy: The Response to Radical Skepticism; Four: Paul Grice and the End of Ordinary Language Philosophy; Five: The Philosophical Naturalism of Willard Van Orman Quine; Six: Donald Davidson on Truth and Meaning; Seven: Saul Kripke on Naming and Necessity.What does twentieth-century analytic philosophy come to? Soames thinks its "two most important achievements" are (i) the recognition that philosophical speculation must be grounded in pre-philosophical thought, and (ii) the success achieved in understanding, and separating one from another, the fundamental methodological notions of logical consequence, logical truth, necessary truth, and apriori truth" (1:xi; see also 1:298-99 and 2:252). He admirably succeeds in making the case for these judgments, although many philosophers will think that these two together do not amount to a great deal, considering all the effort expended by analytic philosophers. I think that analytic philosophy has done more; it has given philosophers many techniques for attacking conceptual problems, a great deal of information about the structure and nature of language, and has decisively refuted various theses that were once thought attractive and even obviously true. In any case, those who think that analytic philosophy, especially conceptual analysis, accomplished nothing are, I think, refuted by these volumes. In his discussion of G. E. Moore's article, "A Defense of Common Sense," Soames explains what he takes to be the first great result of analytic philosophy. Moore showed that the beliefs of common sense should often be accepted "with more confidence" than any philosophical beliefs or propositions that conflict with them, and in these cases cannot be overthrown by philosophical beliefs. For example, "The skeptic assumes that we can be certain about what knowledge is before we decide whether what we all ordinarily take to be paradigmatic cases of knowledge really are genuine" [End Page 125] (23, entire sentence is bold in the original). (Soames uses boldface type to mark all of the significant propositions discussed in the book, a nice pedagogical device.)In his discussion of Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions, Soames gives the impression that linguistic interests primarily motivated Russell. I think the motivation was primarily ontological. Russell wanted to justify ridding philosophy of nonexistent entities. The doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Logical Positivism were two ways in which philosophical analysis developed. For Soames, what is most important in the Tractatus is the theory of names, and he holds, I believe, the minority belief (which I share) that properties are reducible to configurations of objects (1:206-6). What is most important in Logical Positivism is the verification theory of meaning. Strongly verifiable sentences "were supposed to be those the truth of which could, in principle, be completely established... (shrink)

There were five kinds of cyber deterrence presented at the workshop on Landscaping strategic cyber deterrence, hosted at the Oxford Internet Institute. They were the well-studied areas of deterrence by ‘punishment’ and ‘denial’, and the novel concepts of deterrence by ‘association’, ‘norms and taboos’, and finally, ‘entanglement’. In the following workshop commentary, I present these five kinds of deterrence and explain them in light of recent developments in the academy and industry. I argue for analytical congruence between all three novel (...) concepts, since they aim to alter the behaviour of actors by adding a social cost in response to breaking norms and conventions. Throughout, I argue that we are beginning to understand how cyber deterrence works, both in theory and practice, and when all concepts are taken together, they become more than the sum of their parts. Finally, I point out an omission of the workshop, where computational modelling and simulation could be added to the landscape of strategic cyber deterrence. (shrink)